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Mark Tushnet*
Does  anything  distinguish  constitution-talk  from  justice-talk?
Professors  Eisgruber  and Sager have  written  extensively  about what
they  call  the  justice-seeking  Constitutionl-a  document  that  takes
establishing  justice  as  a  goal  for  legislation  and  as  a  guide  to  the
document's  own  interpretation.  Their  position  makes  the
Constitution  and  justice  coincident,  so  that  an  inquiry  into  the
Constitution's  meaning  is  simultaneously,  and  indistinguishably,  an
inquiry  into  justice.2   For  them,  constitution-talk  is  justice-talk.
Should we follow their lead?
The  question  is  particularly  pressing  when  we  think  about  the
Constitution  outside  of  courts.  Inside  the  courts,  one  might
distinguish  between  constitution-talk  and  justice-talk  on  the  ground
that  the  former,  but  not  the  latter,  results  in  enforceable  legal
judgments.  So, inside the courts, we might interpret the  Constitution
with justice  in  mind, but what  we  do  is  produce  legally  enforceable
judgments.  Outside the courts, however, it might seem that all we do
is  interpret  and  talk.  It  is  not  immediately  obvious  that  cloaking
justice-talk  as constitution-talk  outside the courts has much rhetorical
force.3  As I will argue, the fact that invoking the Constitution outside
the  courts,  in  the  course  of  discussing  justice,  does  have  some
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetowvn  University  Law
Center.
1.  Christopher  L.  Eisgruber,  The  Living  Hand of  the  Past:  History  and
Constitutional  Justice,  65 Fordham L. Rev. 1611  (1997);  Lawrence  G. Sager, Justice in
Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional  Law, 88  Nw.  U.  L  Rev.
410 (1993).
2.  Clearly much  of the Constitution  does  not deal with  establishing justice, but
rather an operating government  that has the capacity  to establish justice.  Professors
Sager,  Eisgruber  and  I do  not  contend  that  constitutional  provisions  creating  an
operating  government  should  be  interpreted  directly  with  reference  to  justice.
Presumably though, one would prefer an interpretation of such provisions  that made
it more likely that the government,  once  up and  running, would  establish justice.  I
have referred to such provisions  as the "thick"  Constitution to distinguish them from
the "thin"  Constitution that Professors  Sager, Eisgruber, and  I are concerned  with in
this discussion.  The thin  Constitution  embodies the  principles of the Declaration  of
Independence  and the Constitution's Preamble,  which is the part of the Constitution
concerned  most  directly  with  accomplishing  justice.  Mark  Tushnet,  Taking  the
Constitution Away from the Courts 9-13 (1999).
3.  See  generally  Mark  Tushnet,  What  Is  Constitutional About  Progressive
Constitutionalism?,  4 Widener L. Symp. J. 19 (1999).
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rhetorical  force  helps  to  provide  a  clue  to  the  distinction  between
constitution-talk and justice-talk.
Consider the  following example:  one member  of Congress  asserts
that justice requires  public  authorities to assume  some responsibility
for paying the costs of essential prescription drugs for the elderly  and
the  poor.  Another  member  of  Congress  contends  that  the
Constitution-say,  the  equal  protection  component  of  the  Due
Process  Clause-requires  public  authorities  to  assume  that
responsibility.  Has the second member  said  anything different  from
the first?  Although I confess my doubts, which might seem to suggest
that  I  agree  with  Professors  Sager  and  Eisgruber  on  the  justice-
seeking Constitution, I have, in fact, substantial reservations.
One  speaker,  invoking  justice,  may  draw  on  a  different  set  of
resources  from  another  speaker,  invoking  the  Constitution.  For
example, the justice-speaker  may refer to universal norms of fairness,
or  religious  traditions  regarding  responsibility  for  others,  or  the
rightness,  in  consequentialist  terms,  of  providing  adequate  medical
care.  The  Constitution-speaker,  more  attuned  to  a  legal  tradition,
may  refer  to  the  intent  of  the  Constitution's  drafters,  the
Constitution's  reference  in  the  Preamble  to  securing  justice,  and
scattered  Supreme  Court  cases.  The  constitutional  tradition  is
broader than that and should be understood  to include such doctrines
as  President Franklin  D. Roosevelt's  assertion  that  our Constitution
should  be interpreted  to guarantee  a "right...  to  adequate  medical
care."4
Is  anything  gained  or lost  by treating the  two speeches essentially
the  same?  I  take  it  that  the  gain  seen  by  proponents  of a  justice-
seeking  Constitution  is  the  translation  of  legalistic  concepts  into  a
broader,  justice-oriented  framework,  within  which  can  be  found
thicker  concepts  of  justice  than  can  be  found  in  more  legalistic
sources.  There  are,  however,  concomitant  losses  that  deserve  to  be
noted.
Let us assume that the Constitution-speaker is a lawyer.  Can such a
Constitution-speaker  contribute  anything  distinctive  to  political
discourse,  and  if  so,  is  the  distinctive  contribution  lost  when
constitution-talk is treated as equivalent to justice-talk?  Lawyers have
some specialized  knowledge  and  some distinctive  skills.  These  skills
arise  primarily  in  connection  with  interpreting  texts,  particularly  in
exposing  and  taking  advantage  of  the  ambiguities  we  believe  are
inevitable in any complex text, and, relatedly,  in designing institutions
in  ways  that  are  sensitive  to  interactions  among  their components.'
4.  Tushnet, supra note 2, at  171-72 (quoting  President Roosevelt and grounding
his speech in a constitutional tradition).
5.  An  example  of  the  latter  capacity,  which  I  admire,  is  presented  in  Boris
Bittker, The  Case for Black  Reparations  (1973),  which  examines  a  large number  of
the technical problems that a reparations scheme would have to work out.
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Lawyers,  however,  generally  have  little  to  say  that  is  particularly
insightful about justice, especially if defining justice requires attention
to deep normative  issues in detailed  institutional settings.'  Certainly
the legal academic literature that purports to deal directly  with justice
is  largely  simplistic  and  derivative.7  Anyone  who  wants  to  think
deeply  about  justice  would  do  much  better  reading  political
philosophers than legal academics.8
The shortcomings  of lawyers do not, however, lead me to think that
we  can make progress in resolving practical  problems of governance,
such  as  those  presented  by  the  prescription  drug  issue,  by  talking
about justice as identified with the Constitution.'  Rather, I am led to
wonder why anyone should pay more attention to lawyers'  invocations
of the  Constitution  as  a  source  of  guidance  about  justice  than  to
misters'  invocations  of  the  Bible,  or  political  philosophers'
invocations  of  social  contract  theory.'  While  ministers  and
philosophers  may  help  us  understand  why  adopting  a  prescription
drug plan is required by justice, lawyers may help us figure out how to
draft a statute that effectively  does so.  Lawyers  are better equipped
than philosophers  to figure  out how  to  draft a  statute that  makes it
more difficult for ingenious doctors and drug companies  to evade  the
6.  Lawyers,  though,  can  remind  political  theorists,  focused  primarily  on  the
normative issues, of the need to attend at some point to institutional detail.
7.  I  note  in  particular  the  really  bad  critical  commentary  on  John  Rawls
produced  by  law  professors.  (I  cannot  recall  my  own  contribution  to  such
commentary,  and  I may  have  been cautious enough not  to write any. but I am sure
that  if  I  did,  I  would  be  embarrassed  to  read  it  today.)  For  a  description  of  a
particularly acerbic comment made by someone  who should know, and that illustrates
my general  point here, see Martha  Nussbaum, Still  Worthy of Praise,  111  Harv.  L
Rev. 1776, 1779  (1998)  (describing the comments  a philosophy professor might  make
about  Richard  Posner's  criticism  of  Rawls  "were  she  to  receive  [it]  ...  in  an
undergraduate paper").
8.  This  is  not  to  say  that  particular  legal  academics,  as  different  as  Ronald
Dworkin  and  Patricia  Williams,  have  not  made  important  contributions  to  our
understanding  of justice.  The  ratio  of original  work to  derivative  or uninteresting
work on justice by legal academics, though, is almost certainly lower than that ratio by
political philosophers.
9.  My concern about the failure of law professors  to produce interesting work on
justice  might seem  in tension  with  another  position  I  hold-that  law  is  not itself a
distinctive enterprise; more specifically, it is generally  reducible to politics understood
in a broad sense.  Saying that law is politics, however, is different from saying that law
is justice (in a particular context).  Practical politics requires no specialized knowledge
or skills, but only the knowledge and  skills that anyone develops  living in organized
society.  Figuring out the best political move  in any  given situation may  be  difficult,
but it is something everyone can, and frequently does, do in ordinary life.  My sense  is
that figuring out what justice requires is much more difficult,  and does call upon some
specialized  skills, which some lawyers have, but which are developed more intensively
in the course of training political philosophers.
10.  Perhaps  the answer  is  simply that  this is  the  way  a  particular  subset  of the
population talks about justice, which would be an interesting sociological observation.
if true, but which would not, I think, contribute much to the way people in other parts
of the population should think about the Constitution.
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solutions enacted  to address the problem of moral hazard."  Lawyers
who  spend  too much  time  thinking about justice  may sacrifice  what
they can distinctively contribute to the policy-making process."
Undoubtedly,  lawyers,  as  intelligent people, could  get up  to speed
on the philosophical questions.  We ought to be sensitive, however, to
matters of comparative advantage.  Time is limited, and I know that I
personally  find  it  incredibly  difficult  even  to  keep  up  with  legal
developments  relevant to my areas of expertise.  Trying to assimilate
what  scholars  who  spend  their  time  thinking  systematically  about
justice have said (and continue to say) would certainly reduce the time
I have  available to keep up with legal developments.  Considerations
of comparative  advantage  suggest  that attempting  to stay  abreast  of
political philosophy would be a misallocation of resources.
So  far I  have  focused  on  the  differences  between  what  might  be
called the technical aspects of constitution-talk and justice-talk.  There
is,  in  addition,  a  substantive  difference  between  justice-talk  and
constitution-talk.  Justice-talk  is  generally  universal,  while
constitution-talk  is  nation-specific.13   The  latter  proposition  is
straightforward.  While the Constitution may refer to general concepts
of justice, such as equality, it is ultimately the Constitution of only the
United  States. 4  Although  the  Constitution's  reference  to  equality
surely has implications for the United States  government's  treatment
11.  "Moral hazard" refers to the response expected from rational decision-makers
who  are  insured  against  the  costs  associated  with  some  course  of  action;  when
protected  against  the  associated  costs,  a rational  decision-maker  will  increase  the
amount of that action.  In the present context,  the moral hazard is that patients will
ask doctors  to prescribe  more  drugs  than the doctors otherwise  would, because  the
patients  do not have  to pay  the full cost of the  drugs, and doctors will accede  to the
request because the doctors bear no costs from over-prescribing.
12.  I offer  the following  in a quite speculative  vein:  the past  generation  of legal
scholarship has seen (a)  progressive scholarship dominated  by research  in the justice-
seeking  tradition,  (b)  conservative  scholarship  dominated  by  research  in  a formalist
and  legalistic  tradition,  and  (c)  an  increasing  hold  of conservative  scholarship  in
academic  and public  debates.  Perhaps  the last phenomenon  derives from  the  first
two.  That is, progressive lawyers,  thinking that law and justice are  indistinguishable,
may  have  abandoned  the  field  of  law  to  conservatives.  They  have  criticized
conservative  legal scholarship for being formalist and  legalistic, rather than providing
reasons that the conservatives'  arguments are  defective qua legal  arguments.  Except
for  the  assertions  by  progressives  that  law  is  indistinguishable  from  justice,
conservatives have been left to hold the ground of law unchallenged.
13.  Subject to a qualification discussed below.
14.  For  explicit  references  to  the  nation-specificity  of  the  United  States
Constitution, see Stanford v.  Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,  369 n.1  (1989)  ("We emphasize
that  it  is  American  conceptions  of  decency  that  are  dispositive,  rejecting  the
contention..,  that  the  sentencing  practices  of  other  countries  are  relevant."
(emphasis in original)); Printz v.  United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11  (1997)  ("Justice
Breyer's  dissent  would  have  us  consider  the benefits  that  other countries,  and  the
European  Union,  believe they have  derived  from federal  systems  that  are  different
from  ours.  We  think  such  comparative  analysis  inappropriate  to  the  task  of
interpreting  a  constitution,  though  it  was  of course  quite  relevant  to  the  task  of
writing one.").
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of people beyond this nation's borders,15 the Constitution remains tied
to  the  particular  people  and  history  of  the  United  States.
Constitution-talk,  therefore,  is  about  what  "We  the  People  of  the
United  States"  ought to do.  Of course, what  "We the People  of the
United  States"  ought  to  do  may  well  have  some  connection  to
advancing  justice,  as  the  Constitution's  Preamble  asserts. 6  In  this
way, constitution-talk may be contingently connected  to justice-talk, a
point to which I will return.
Justice-talk,  in  contrast,  is  about  what  ought  to  be  done  by  any
person  or group  of  people  in  a  particular  situation.  This  is  most
obvious when justice-talk  turns to identifying universal  human rights,
or rights that attach to people by virtue  of their personhood.  But it
occurs  as  well when justice-talk  deals  with  the  rights  and  duties  of
people in specific positions, such as parents and children, or citizens  of
relatively  wealthy  nations.  I  cannot  imagine  a  serious  political
philosopher writing about the justice-derived rights  and duties  of the
American  people  as  such.  The  American  people,  from  a
philosopher's  point of view, are simply an  aggregation  of individuals
who  happen-by  chance-to  be  located  within  the  philosophically
arbitrary territorial boundaries  of the United States.  Of course, those
people,  or  at  least  some  of them,  might  have  some justice-relevant
characteristics,  such  as relatively  high wealth.  In that event, what is
interesting to the political philosopher  is their relatively  high  wealth,
not their location within United States borders. 11
So,  it seems  to me, justice-talk  is  universal  and  constitution-talk,
even constitution-talk  invoking justice-related  constitutional  terms, is
parochial.  Although  the  term parochial tends  to  have  pejorative
connotations, perhaps those connotations should be ignored.  I have a
relatively  narrow  point  and  a  more  general  point  to make  on  this
issue.  The  narrow  point  is  that  constitution-talk  is  parochial
compared  to justice-talk's universalism  because constitution-talk,  as a
subset  of  law-talk,  necessarily  emphasizes  the  degree  to  which
circumstances  alter  cases.  As  lawyers,  we are  trained  to  appreciate
this in two ways.  Suppose we are given one case and a legal rule that
governs  it,  then  are  presented  with  a  second  case,  and  are  asked
whether the  same  legal  rule should  apply.  A  lawyer's  instinct  is  to
look for differences between the cases that are relevant  to the reasons
15.  For  a  comprehensive  discussion  of  the  extraterritorial  implications  of  the
United  States  Constitution,  see  Gerald  L.  Neuman,  Strangers  to  the  Constitution:
Immigrants, Borders, and Fundamental  Law (1996).
16.  We should also acknowledge the possibility that the Constitution  is, at least  in
some dimensions, unjust in ways  that interpretation  cannot  eliminate. See Robin  L
West, Constitutional  Scepticism, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 765, 774 (1992)  (urging that political
progressives be "sceptical about the Constitution's value").
17.  I think it significant, for example, that John Rawls has recently written of the
law of peoples, describing the subjects of his concern  as aggregations of people  who
satisfy  certain general criteria.  John  Rawls, The  Law of Peoples:  with,  The Idea  of
Public Reason Revisited 23-25 (1999)  (describing the "basic features of peoples").
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for  the  rule's  adoption.  Lawyers'  professional  training  makes  us
skeptical  about  the  propriety  of  abstracting  rules  too  far  from  the
circumstances  under which they arose.  That professional  skepticism is
a kind of parochialism:  legal rules, like nations,  have a more limited
domain  than universal  principles  of justice.  Furthermore,  given  two
cases and  a single rule, we are frequently tempted to reformulate the
rule  so  that  "it"  provides  correct  outcomes  in  both  cases.  This
temptation again channels us towards narrowly framed rules and away
from broadly stated universal principles.
To make my more general point, I return for a moment to political
philosophy.  Political  philosophers have  had  notorious  difficulties  in
providing satisfactory justification for  special obligations, such  as the
ones I have  to my wife and  children, not because  I am  a member  of
the classes spouse and parent,  but because they are simply my wife and
children.'"  The literature  is  full  of labored  efforts to defend  special
obligations  by  somehow  invoking  the  universalist  terms  of  general
political  philosophy,  which,  as  Bernard  Williams  pointedly  wrote,
produces "one thought too many."19  It is a thought too many because
parochial  or  special  relationships  are sources  of value  in  themselves
and  are  not  examples  of  more  general  phenomena.  Again,  my
relationship to my wife and children is a source of value to me because
I am their husband and father, not because the relationship falls within
the class  of spousal  and parental  relationships.  Moreover,  I  believe
that special relationships are sources  of value  in ways that have some
connection to advancing justice outside such relationships."
Constitution-talk, precisely because it is inherently parochial, avoids
the  difficulty  of forcing  special  relationships into  general  categories.
When  we engage in constitution-talk,  we  are talking with each other
as  co-citizens  or co-members  of the United States;  the uniqueness  of
our relation is inherent in the use of constitution-talk.  At this point, it
seems to me, two questions arise.  First, is co-membership in a nation
like the  United  States  the  right sort  of special  relationship  that  can
properly  stand  apart  from  "mere"  membership  in  the  world
community or the human species?"' Second, even if co-membership in
some  nation  is  the  right  sort  of  special  relationship,  is  the  United
States the right kind of nation?
18.  The  philosophical  literature  deals  with  this  problem  by  asking  whether
obligations  of justice  can  be  agent-relative.  Including  citations  to  that  literature
would  be  misleading  to  the  extent  that  it  might  suggest,  not  that  I  know  of  its
existence, but that I understand it.
19.  Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980,  at 18  (1981).
20.  The general thought, which would need far more defense  than I am competent
to provide,  is that  deracinated  cosmopolitans  cannot  have  commitments  to anyone,
even to others considered simply as members of the human species.
21.  In  contrasting  the  membership  in  the  United  States  to  membership  in  the
human species, I do not mean to foreclose  consideration of obligations we might  have
as humans to non-humans.
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The  first question  arises  from  the  thought  that, for  many  people,
relations with co-members  of the nation are far weaker than relations
with non-members.  Many readers of this essay, for example, probably
have  closer normative  and moral ties to members  of the transatlantic
elite than with most residents  of Iowa.'  Similarly,  some  may have
closer normative and moral ties to members of the Catholic church in
Africa  and  India  than  they  do  to  evangelical  Protestants  in  South
Carolina.  If co-membership  in the United States is not the right sort
of special relationship  that can  stand  apart  from  membership  in  the
world  community,  then  constitution-talk  would  be  different  from
justice-talk,  and  may  not  contribute  to  advancing  justice.  Thus,
although co-membership  in some nations may provide justice-related
value to some people, membership in  a nation as large and diverse as
the United States may not.'
Against  this  background,  I  would  contend  that  constitution-talk
may  matter  because  the  Constitution  constitutes  the  American
people.  As  I  have  mentioned  earlier,  the  provisions  of the  thick
Constitution have little to do, directly, with establishing justice (or the
other  goals  set  out  in  the  Preamble),  whereas  those  of  the  thin
Constitution  do.24  One  notable point  about  the  thick  and  the  thin
Constitution  is  that  both  provide  opportunities  for  Americans  to
engage  in  discussions  about  an  object  held  in  common.  To  use  an
example  that only law  professors could  find interesting,  people  from
New York, Texas, and Wyoming can come  together in a discussion of
whether  Texas'  members  of  the  Electoral  College  could  cast  their
votes for both George W. Bush and Richard Cheney.  This and similar
discussions matter because they deal with the way  we all are going to
find  ourselves  governed.  The  Constitution,  then,  is  one  thing-
perhaps the only thing-around  which  everyone  in the  United States
can gather.  It may be a large part of what makes us Americans rather
than cosmopolitans or (merely) Catholics or Jews or Protestants.
Beyond  that,  there  are  the  thin  Constitution's  commitments  to
justice.  Those  commitments  do  not  prescribe  outcomes-precisely
because  they are thin.  Constitution-talk  about the  thin  Constitution
may differ from justice-talk  in this regard  because justice-talk  aims at
identifying  the  correct  principles  of justice.  Constitution-talk  about
the  thin  Constitution  does  not  have  that  aim,  although  each
participant in the conversation  may hope that the outcome  will be the
choice of the correct principles.  Rather, the aim of people engaged in
constitution-talk about the thin Constitution is the conversation itself.
If the United States  is not the right kind of community,  constitution-
22.  I refer  to Iowa  specifically because  most  of my spouse's  family  continues  to
live there.
23.  Sometimes  I think of this as the "what's he to Hecuba"  problem. See William
Shakespeare,  Hamlet act 2, sc.  2 ("What's Hecuba  to him, or he  to Hecuba, That he
should weep for her?").
24.  See supra  note 2.
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talk would be different from justice-talk, and would not contribute to
advancing  justice.  This  thin  Constitution  strives  not  to  achieve
particular  principles  of  justice  but  to  advance  the  enterprise  of
establishing justice.2  Justice-talk can thus enter into constitution-talk,
but the latter remains distinctive  because it is about the commitments
of a particular  people, not about the requirements  of some universal
principles of justice.
I  conclude  that  constitution-talk  differs  from justice-talk  because
the latter is necessarily  connected  to justice itself, while the former is
only contingently connected to justice.  It is an accident, but a happy
one, that the United  States  Constitution contributes  to constituting  a
people among whose commitments is the establishment of justice.
25.  Politics  will  determine  the  actual  outcomes  of conversations  about  the  thin
Constitution's  principles,  in  a world  where  people  reasonably  disagree  about  the
implications  of those principles for particular problems.
2006 [Vol. 69